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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
AERIAL DOMAIN AND THE LAW OF NATIONS.
In any discussion of the aerial domain of States and their
rights and duties therein with relation to each other it is well
to consider first the conceptions of private law as to the right
of the individual landowner, since the doctrines to be adopted
in the former sphere, to be sound, must at least not do violence
to the latter.
A study of various systems and the works of text-writers
reveals two major and opposing views with respect to the
landowner's rights in the aerial space above his land; the
first, that he has no rights, since the air is incapable of being
possessed in any material sense; and the second, that the land-
owner does possess rights. Those holding the former view
appear to have confused the column of air in a given space at
a particular time with the space itself, and it may be said that
this school is a very small minority. On the other hand, those
who concede rights to the landowner in th.e superincumbent
space are not at all agreed as to the extent of those rights.
Some hold that the right is less than ownership and is little
more than a right of user only to the extent of the proper en-
joyment of the land itself. The theories, range from this point
up to that of full and complete proprietary rights. The last
mentioned is the view most widely acted upon and it is de-
rived from the maxim of the Roman system that whoever owns
the land owns all below and above the surface-cuius est solum
ejus est usque ad coelum.1
This is the doctrine adopted into our common law and by
a great majority of States. Thus the Code Napoleon say8:
"Property in land includes property above the land."
German law likewise embraces the principle though it has
undergone some statutory modification recently in the interest
of aerial navigation. The same is true of the codes of other
European States. They still concede proprietary rights in the
aerial space but restrict their exercise.2
1. Coke on Litt., sec. 4a.
I German Civil Code, 1900, sec. 905; Swiss Civil Code, sec. 667.
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It is settled that the proprietor of the surface owns usque
ad inferos and that an actionable trespass is committed by any
entry beneath the surface at whatever depth; it is likewise as
generally conceded that he owns usque ad coelum, yet it is not
wholly clear what entries above the surface constitute action-
able trespass. All courts appear to be agreed that the unau-
thorized interference with anything in the air connected with
the land constitute trespass, and it has been uniformly held
that an owner may rightfully cut wires strung over his land
without his consent. In the case of Pickering v. Rudd,3 de-
cided by Lord Ellenborough in 1815, that jurist said:
"But I am by no means prepared to say that firing across
a field in vacuo, no part of the contents touching it, amounts
to a clausum fregit. If this part overhanging the plaintiff's
garden be a trespass it would follow that an aeronaut is liable
to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit at the suit of the
occupier of every field over which his balloon passes in the
course of his voyage."
American courts appear to have been influenced by this
decision, at least by the dictum with respect to discharging a
gun through the aerial space of another, and hold it actionable
trespass where any shot fall upon the ground, regardless of
the insignificance of damage.4
Lord Ellenborough's successors have not fully accepted
his views, however. Thus Lord Bowen says:
"An owner of land has the right to object to anybody put-
ting anything over his land at any height in the sky. It is not
necessary to decide how far one is to justify the principle that
the man who has land has everything above or at all events is
entitled to object to anything else being put above it. ' 5
Hence, a captive balloon, carried by air currents into the
aerial space of an adjoining landowner, may constitute tres-
pass, or, at any rate, a nuisance. In the interest of utility and
the development of a science that promises to give man com-
3. 4 Camp. 219, 220 (1815).
4. Whittaker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386.
5. Kenyon v. Hart, 6 B. & S. 249a-252; Wandsworth Bd. of Wks. v.
United Tel. Co., 13 A. B. 904; Finckley Elec. L. Co. v. Urban Council (1903),
1 ch. 440.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss2/3
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
mand of the air, as he has that of land and water, it would seem
desirable to concede a privilege of passage to aircraft and
limit the owner's right to object to cases where he suffers
some detriment. Such is substantially the doctrine adopted
by Germany and Switzerland.
Enough has been said of the private rights of the land-
owner in the aerial space over his own land to reveal their
nature as proprietary in practice, subject, of course, to such
modification by municipal or national law as the State may
deem necessary. These conceptions necessarily imply the
doctrine of national sovereignty in the aerial space and point
the only sound way for the development of rules of the law
of nations touching the subject.
Until the recent Great War gave its tremendous stimulus
to the development of aerial navigation, the question of aerial
domain in the law of nations was almost wholly academic and
speculative, though a decade before, the developments in wire-
less telegraphy had presented some occasion for concrete
discussion. As early as 1899 the States of the World took cog-
nizance of the possibility of the use of the air in war and The
Hague Conference of that year adopted a declaration agree-
ing "to prohibit, for a term of five years, the launching of
projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new
methods of a similar nature." As Captain Crozier of the
American technical staff reported, it was felt that balloons
and other aircraft, as they existed, constituted such inaccurate
agencies of war as to be incapable of regulated use.
Followipg this the appearance of wireless telegraphy tend-
ed to increase the practical aspects of the subject of aerial
space and in 1903, on the initiative of Germany, a conference
assembled in Berlin and produced a convention relating to
communication between ships and coastal stations by means
of wireless for the better protection of maritime commerce.
In 1906 this convention was enlarged. While the question of
transmitting the so-called radio waves across State frontiers
must necessarily have been in the minds of representatives
there was no immediate occasion for considering it.
6. The Hague Declaration IV, I, 1899.
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The Institute of International Law, seeing the growing im-
portance of rules to regulate the advances of science in the
use of aerial space, met at Ghent in 1906, to devote itself
wholly to this subject; and there was submitted to it by M.
Paul Fauchille a draft code to be applied both in time of peace
and in time of war, which the Institute adopted.
It is a little puzzling to observe the trend of thought among
even eminent jurists of this very recent period as to the cor-
rect principles to be applied. The very first article of the
eode,7 for example, sets out that:
"The air is free. States have in the air, both in the time
of peace and in time of war, only those rights which are neces-
sary for their conservation."
Here is a bold denial of the principle of national sover-
eignty in aerial space, a view that is wholly unhistorical and in
antagonism with all of the implications of private law. The
arguments used to support the proposition that States possess
land domain and fluvial domain but no aerial domain were
prompted by a false idealism which found an analogy between
aerial space and the high seas, and, recalling the troubled his-
tory of the latter, resolved to render that of the former secure.
But as Mr. H. D. Hazeltine8 pointed out in 1911, it is im-
possible to argue from the freedom of the seas to ithe freedom
of the air. The sea lies off one side of a State's landed terri-
tory while the air lies above. As ships, for example, recede
from a State's coasts they become with increasing distance, of
less and less danger or concern, whereas the higher airships
mount in the heavens the greater the potential danger to the
land beneath from objects falling, through design or by acci-
(lent. To argue, therefore, for a right of innocent passage
through the air as through territorial waters in time of peace
is to misunderstand the nature and relations of the two ele-
ments; while to open the air freely to belligerents would be
merely to extend the theatre of hostilities and confound the
rights of neutrals.
It was to be expected that among those seeing an analogy
7. Annuaire, 1906. p. 305.
8. Law of the Air.
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between the air and the sea there would be some wha would
urge the application of the principle of territorial waters to a
certain area immediately above the landed domain. Such a
group appeared but its members are far from agreement as to
the-extent of territorial space in which the State may exercise
exclusive jurisdiction. The principle of territorial waters
rests upom the necessities of self-protection and the extent of
such waters was fixed at a marine league or three nautical
miles, as the range of cannon shot, in the days of' Bynkershoek.
There it has remained in spite of the ever-increasing range of
modern vrtillery. The principle is wholly inapplicable to
aerial space since it cannot be justified on the grounds of pro-
tection; in practice, it would actually malke for insecurity.
There is, of course, a very great difference between the
passage of radio waves through a State's aerial space and the
passage of aircraft. The one is intangible and, so far as we
know, can cause little or no inconvenience or danger; the other
is a weighty, substantial body capable of great injury and de-
struction, by design or accident.
Certainly, in the development of radio up to this time pri-
vate law has not considered the passage of these waves as
worthy of its cognizance, however desirable general regulation
may be as a matter of State policy.
The consideration given to aerial space in the law of na-
tions by the Institute of International Law was followed by
the production of an extensive literature and the appearance
of a number of codes of the most divergent character. A re-
view of this material shows theories of the legal nature of
aerial domain to fall into about a half dozen categories, which
may be summarized as follows:
1. The theory of the Institute of International Law of
1906 that the air should be absolutely free for purposes of
aerial navigation by aviators of all countries.
2. The so-called zone theory, that though the air is free
the subjacent State should have a certain right of control up
to a certain height.
3. The theory of freedom of the air coupled with an ac-
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k-nowledgment of the right of the subjacent State to control
it to an indefinite height for purposes of its own protection.
4. The theory of absolute sovereignty on a parity with that
recognized as to the land domain.
5. The theory of absolute sovereignty qualified by the
right of innocent passage.
All of these propositions have a respectable following or,
at least, have been advocated at various times by writers of
distinction. The arguments of all those proposing absolute
freedom of the air appear to rest primarily upon the inap-
propriable character of this element and its alleged insuscepti-
bility of control. Clearly they have confused the element with
the space: and the contention that this space cannot be con-
trolled, as by artillery and an air fleet, is no longer sound.
Since the meeting of 1906 the Institute of International Law
has modified its views as to the right of subjacent States to
protect themselves as neutrals by proposing to forbid belliger-
ent aircraft to penetrate into their aerial space, but it still
clings to the doctrine of freedom.
Theories gave way to practical answers to some of these
questions during the Great War. The old inhibition against
dropping projectiles from balloons, adopted at The Hague in
1899, lapsed in 1904 and no like restrictions were acceptable in
1906 at the second conference in view of the progress that had
been made in aerial navigation and the prospective usefulness
of this new weapon. The only existing international legisla-
tion was contained in the code of land warfare forbidding the
bombardment of "undefended towns, villages, etc., by any
means whatever." But as there was no definition of an "unde-
fended town'-as the presence of a single soldier might be
sufficient to constitute it a defended town-bombardment by
aircraft was practically no more restricted by law than bom-
bardment by land batteries.
The first instance of assertion of sovereignty over aerial
domain was made by Switzerland in protests ' to Germany
9. The Hague, Convt. IV, 1909.
10. Garner Jnt. Law ind the World War, ch. XIX.
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against the violation of her neutrality by German aviators who
flew over her territory in the course of a raid on Belfort in
October, 1914. In the following month British and French
aviators flew over Swiss territory to attack the Zeppelin estab-
lishment at Friedrichshafen. In the same months German
Zeppelins flew over Dutch territory, provoking like protests
from Holland. Switzerland and Holland claimed exclusive
and absolute national sovereignty in the aerial space and both
asserted the entry of belligerent aircraft to constitute a viola-
tion of territory. In November, 1914, Mr. Churchill, first Lord
of -the Admiralty, admitted in the House of Commons that
British f nd French aviators had violated Swiss territory,
though without intention to do so; and British airmen there-
after were formally instructed not to enter neutral aerial
space. Similarly Germany acquiesced in the assertion of Hol-
land of national sovereignty in her aerial space. Violations
of neutral aerial space became so frequent as the war
progressed, however, that both Switzerland and Holland
adopted the policy of expelling violatots by force in 1915,
through the use of aircraft guns; and Dutch coast guards
actually brought down the Zeppelin L-19, on its return from a
raid upon England. The giant ship fell into the sea and in
consequence of the refusal of the British trawler, King Ste-
phen, to rescue the crew, they were drowned.
Germany protested vigorously to Holland in this case, on
the ground that the Zeppelin L-19 was disabled and was in
the position of a vessel driven by stress of weather or unsea-
worthiness to seek shelter in a neutral port. But she did not
challenge the right asserted by Holland to repel by force vio-
lations of her aerial space.
These practices appear to have put an end to theory and
to have established the principle of aerial domain and na-
tional sovereignty therein, certainly as between a neutral and
a belligerent.
The next practical question that arose was that of the
rights and duties of neutrals toward belligerent aircraft, con-
cerning which there existed neither custom nor law. There
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were two principles, either one of which might have been ap-
plied; namely, that applicable to belligerent troops coming
upon the land domain and that applicable to belligerent naval
forces coming within neutral territorial waters. In the for-
mer case it is the right and duty of the neutral to disarm and
intern the land force; in the latter, it is the right and duty of
the neutral to permit a limited stay and a replenishment of
fuel and supplies. Both Switzerland and Holland adopted the
former principle in dealing with belligerent aircraft coming
within their power, dismantling 'he machines and interning
the crews. Obviously, to have applied the latter rule would
have been highly dangerous, involving the possibility of the
use of neutral territory as a base of operations.
Again, this practice, in which all belligerents appear to
have acquiesced, seems to have established the right and duty
of neutrals to deal with belligerent aircraft and aviators by
analogy to the rules applicable to land warfare, including the
right and duty to repel intentional violations by force. It is
probable that the next few years will bring forth some conven-
tional regulations, comparable to the Declaration of London,
setting out definitely the rights and duties of belligerents and
neutrals with respect to aircraft in war which will modify and
extend the rights and duties to be inferred from the practices
in the Great War.
The Congress of Versailles of 1919 attempted, in addition
to the peace settlement, to create a code of law for the air, ap-
plicable to times of peace, and it appointed a Commission on
Air Navigation to draft such a convention. A convention"
was evolved after much difficulty in attempting to harmonize
irreconcilable views, but the United States and Japan de-
clined to sign it. It is, therefore, without authority as law,
though it is interesting as a -revelation of the views of the
other allied powers and exhibits the trend of development.
At the outset the convention recognizes that every State
has complete and exclusive sovereignty above its land and wa-
ter domain, but it pledges all signatory States to accord free-
11. Convention on International Air Navigation, Paris, 1919.
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(loi of innocent passage to foreign aircraft provided the con-
ditions of tho convention are observed. The unanimity of
States with respect to the principle of national sovereignty
in air space may be said to confirm this as a fundamental law
of the future, whatever concessions may be yielded by treaty.
It is not so evident, however, that a majority of the States are
willing to concede the principle of innocent passage as it ex-
ists with respect to ships in territorial waters; and the solu-
tion of this conflict is probably to be found in an international
convention for some form of regulated passage. The problem
of customs control over aircraft would seem to require a de-
nial of any right of innocent passage.
One of the least acceptable provisions of the draft code
is to be found in Article 23, which sets out:
"The legal relations between persons on board an aircraft
in flight are governed by the law of the nationality of the air-
craft."
This clause appears plainly to contradict the basic prin-
ciple of exclusive national sovereignty in aerial space and
harks back to the earlier theories founded on the supposed
analogy between the air and the sea. In practice it would
place aircraft in the situation of a merchantman on the high
seas, which, by the law of nations, is under the jurisdiction of
the flag of its registry. It ignores the principle of national
sovereignty as it applies to foreign merchantmen coming into
the territorial waters of States other than that of its registry.
As we know, such foreign merchantmen are as fully sub-
jected to the jurisdiction of the State whose waters are en-
tered as any other private property. In so far as aircraft
may be public, it would, of course, be logical and accord with
settled principles, to recognize their immunity from the juris-
diction of any other States whose aerial space they entered,
thus adapting the maritime rule with respect to publie vessels.
A subsequent paragraph of Article 23 declares that the
jurisdiction as to crimes and misdemeanors committed on
board an aircraft in flight shall be that of the State of the air-
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craft's registry, unless the aircraft lands, in which case the
State in whose aerial domain the offenses were committed
hall then have jurisdiction. Here again the absolute char-
acter of national sovereignty in the air is apparently denied
in criminal matters contrary to the established Anglo-Ameri-
can view of criminal jurisdiction as being essentially terri-
torial. This paragraph has its explanation in the influence of
Continental European conceptions of law as personal, as
well as territorial, in its operation. Thus a number of Euro-
pean States have made full provision in their systems of crim-
inal law for the punishment of offenses wherever committed
by their nationals. 12 And such States usually insist in their
extradition treaties upon non-surrender of their own na-
tionals, preferring to try them at home for offenses committed
abroad. Unless the United States embraced this Roman idea
of law it could not subscribe to Article 23.
As to the practical problems of air navigation, including
such matters as certificates, licenses, marks, light, signals,
rules of airway and the like, the draft code gives evidence of
conscientious work by men of experience. The code can never
become effective, however, until the conflict between the Con-
tinental European and Anglo-American systems has been rec-
onciled, nor is it probable that the United States will accept
any convention that does not recognize the necessary impli-
cations flowing from the principle of exclusive and absolute
national sovereignty in its aerial domain.
The growth of aerial navigation in the United States is
daily emphasizing the need of adequate legislation by Con-
gress. That the national government is competent to absorb
almost the whole field of regulation is clearly implied in nu-
merous decisions 3 construing the interstate commerce clause,
though it is not at all improbable that the question of inter-
state and intrastate navigation by the air will precipitate the
same controversies that arose out of the regulation of rail-
roads. STERING E. EDMUNDS.
12. Moore's Digest, Vol. IV, sec. 594.
13. U. S. v. Rio Grande D. & I. Co., 174 U. S. 690; L. & N. R. R. v. Eu-
bank, 184 U. S. 27.
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